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Battle of Kursk

The Battle of Kursk refers to German and Soviet operations on the Eastern Front during World War II in the vicinity of the city of Kursk, ( south of Moscow) in the Soviet Union in July and August 1943. It remains both the largest series of armored clashes, including the Battle of Prokhorovka, and the costliest single day of aerial warfare. It was the final strategic offensive the Germans were able to mount in the east. The resulting decisive Soviet victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Germans hoped to shorten their lines by eliminating the Kursk salient (also known as the Kursk bulge), created in the aftermath of their defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. They envisioned pincers breaking through its northern and southern flanks to achieve a great encirclement of Red Army forces. However, the Soviets had excellent intelligence of Adolf Hitler's intentions. This and German delays to wait for new weapons, mainly Tiger and Panther tanks,Dunn 1997, p. xKasdorf, p. 16. gave the Red Army time to construct a series of defense lines and gather large reserve forces for a strategic counterattack.Glantz 1989, pp. 149–59. Although often thought of primarily as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole demonstrated the triumph of engineers, infantry, and artillery over armored forces when utilized as part of a strategy of defense in depth. The Soviet plan was to blunt the German panzer spearheads in an interconnected web of minefields, defensive strongpoints, and concealed anti-tank guns comprising eight defense lines. Collectively, the defensive works around Kursk formed a contiguous belt over 250 km deep—more than 10 times deeper than the vaunted Maginot Line—and bristling with more Soviet anti-tank guns than attacking German tanks, making it by far the most powerful defensive line ever constructed, with more than three times the depth required to stop the German attack.Keegan 2006 . When the German forces had exhausted themselves against the defences, the Soviets responded with their own counteroffensives, which allowed the Red Army to retake Orel and Belgorod on 5 August and Kharkov on 23 August, and push back the Germans across a broad front. Though the Red Army had success in winter, this was the first successful strategic Soviet summer offensive of the war. The model strategic operation earned a place in war college curricula.When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived infallibility of Blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the hopes of the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east. Kursk announced to the world that for every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one available to those who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop it.Glantz, Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk. The Battle of Kursk was the first battle in which a Blitzkrieg offensive had been defeated before it could break through enemy defences and into its strategic depths.Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.

Background

In the winter of 1942–43, the Red Army conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. About 800,000 German and other Axis troops were lost, including the entire German Sixth Army, seriously depleting Axis strength in the east. In 1917, the Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their lines and thereby strengthening their defense. They planned on repeating this strategy in the USSR and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan line. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated. In February and March 1943, German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein won the Third Battle of Kharkov, which left the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. In the middle lay a large 200 km (120 mi) wide and 150 km (90 mi) deep Soviet-held salient, or bulge, in the lines between German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Kharkov in the south. Most of the German front commanders agreed a defensive stance should be the priority, to contain Soviet offensives and deliver counter blows. Hitler accepted this advice. Erich von Manstein insisted a first strike was still an option and an offensive to pinch out the Soviet bulge at Kursk would be achievable before moving further south to recover more lost territory. Manstein wanted to attack in May but owing to the poor tank strength of the German Army, Hitler delayed until July when newer tanks minimized the risk of defeat. The High Command ( Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) hoped to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front.Overy 1995, p. 87.

German plans

Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had successfully pursued at Kharkov, where he had cut off an overextended Red Army offensive. He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, which would lead them into the Donets Basin in eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov. German Army High Command (OKH) did not approve of Manstein's plan and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Two Red Army Fronts, the Voronezh and Central Fronts, occupied the ground in and around the salient and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line and recapture the strategically useful railway city of Kursk, located on the main north-south railway line from Rostov to Moscow. In March, the plans crystallized. Walter Model's 9th Army would attack southwards from Orel while Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk but if the offensive went well, they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to re-establish a new line at the Don River, several weeks' march to the east. Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the OKH considerable control over the planning of the operation. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping other areas of the German line of anything useful for deployment in the operation. They first set the attack for 4 May, but delayed in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new Tiger and Panther tanks. Hitler postponed the offensive several more times. On 5 May, the launch date became 12 June. Due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy and delays in armor deliveries, Hitler set the launch date to 20 June. On 17 June, he further postponed it until 3 July, and then later to 5 July.Kulish & Taylor 1974, p. 170.Source: German Nation Archive microfilm publication T78, Records of the German High Command( Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Roll 343, Frames 6301178–180 confirms Hitler's teletype to Rommel about reinforcing southern Italy with armored forces destined to be used for Zitadelle.Mulligan 1987, p. 239. The concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and for the Germans usually successful) double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-style method and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a pitched battle. Such breakthroughs were easier to achieve by attacking in unexpected locations, as the Germans had done in the Ardennes in 1940, Kiev in 1941, and towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone with a basic grasp of military strategy could deduce that the Kursk salient was the most obvious target for a potential German attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked Hitler: The German force numbered fifty divisions, including 17 Panzer and Panzergrenadiere, among them the elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division as well as Waffen-SS divisions 1st SS PzGrenDiv Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS PzGrenDiv Das Reich and 3rd SS PzGrenDiv Totenkopf grouped into the II SS Panzer Corps. The High Command concentrated all their armor, the Tiger and new Panther tanks and the new Ferdinand tank destroyer, which were used as assault guns. They massed a high proportion of their available air units and artillery; there was also a formidable concentration of armor. The German deception plan included defensive-sounding names for major formations. For example, the 9.Armee was given the name "Festungsstab II", Fortress Staff II. Model ordered that recordings were to be made of massed German tanks' engines. This noise was to be played on loudspeakers to confuse the Soviets as to the whereabouts of German armor concentrations.Bergström 2007, p. 16. Many German AFVs were painted with new divisional insignia used only for this campaign. These deception measures were generally unsuccessful.

Soviet plans

The Red Army had also begun planning their summer offensives, and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten the line and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes. Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans. The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise but in this case, Kursk seemed the obvious target. Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. Marshal Georgiy Zhukov had already predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April, when he wrote his initial report to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the Red Army. Anastas Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs that he was notified about the attack in general details by Stalin on 27 March. The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opponents, including the Red Army. On the other hand, Soviet results during both winters had shown that their own offensives were now effective. Stalin and some Stavka officers wanted to strike first. The overwhelming majority of Stavka, most notably Zhukov, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves. Zhukov wrote in a letter to Stalin on 8 April 1943: The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to turn the salient into one of the most heavily defended areas in history. Two fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines and the Steppe Front was available as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid altogether 434,667 land mines and built 604 powerful anti-tank barriers.Kurowski, Franz, Panzer Aces: German Tank Commanders of WWII, Stackpole Books, 2004, p. 170. A trench system 5000 km (3000 mi) wide to a depth of 175 km (95 mi) was also constructed. They massed a huge army, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, and 2,792 aircraft. This amounted to 26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft, and 46% of its tanks.V.M Kulish & A.J.P Taylor 1974, p. 168. Due to the disparity in population size, industrial capabilityClarke 1966, p. 313. and continual German delays in tank production, the Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and matériel. The Germans received reports of rapid and powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area and delayed the offensive to allow for more Panther tanks to reach the front line.Clarke 1966, p. 327. Many of the forces assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad but the Red Army also added over one million new men in the first half of 1943. Thus the Red Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train. The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from 45mm, 57mm, and 85 mm towed anti-tank guns and 76.2mm divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German 9th Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometre of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south the density was lower, with about 10 guns per kilometre. The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometre of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometre and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometre. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Like the intended German deceptions, the Soviet deception plans were elaborate. However, unlike the German plans, the Soviet ruses were generally successful. Dummy positions were constructed and dummy aircraft were placed on false airfields and false radio traffic sent to confuse German intelligence. Camouflaging of actual positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units had of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns was their own vehicles exploding.

State of the Red Air Force

The Red Air Force (VVS) had lost over 36,900 aircraft in 1941-1942. The Soviet aircraft industry was able to replace losses in machines and had now rearmed, while dispensing with obsolete types such as the I-16, MiG-3 and the LaGG-3. The most widely used Soviet fighters in the Kursk battle were the Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5. The La 5FN was considered to be a match for both the Bf 109 and Fw 190.Bergström 2007, p. 22. However, pilot training was scanty. The 13,383 Soviet pilots who were trained in 1942 received 13–15 flight hours before combat. Shturmovik and bomber pilots received just 18 and 15 hours respectively. Of the Soviet bomber and ground attack units, just seven percent of its pilots had seen action prior to Kursk.Bergström 2007, p. 23. Most Soviet pilots were forced to train on the aircraft they would fly in combat. Training accidents cost the Soviets 10,600 aircraft up until the summer of 1943.Bergström, Mikhailov, Dikov & Antipov 2000, p. 16. The Soviets possessed highly skilled leaders, such as Colonel General Aleksandr Novikov, Commander-in-Chief of the VVS in the Kursk region, but a lack of experience at lower levels led to costly losses. In the aftermath of Kursk, Soviet aviation rapidly improved its coordination with ground forces. Its pilots also benefited from a rapidly improving training program. As a result, the Soviets were able to build the Red Banner units of highly skilled fighter pilots. Just six months after Kursk, the ratio of Soviet to German aircraft losses had decreased from 4:1 to 3:2.Bergström 2007, p. 44.

Opposing forces

Wehrmacht

Red Army

Order of battle: Central Front (Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky) Order of battle: Voronezh Front (Army General Nikolai Watutin) Order of battle: Steppe Front ( Ivan Konev) For their attack, the Wehrmacht used three armies and a large proportion of their tanks on the eastern front. The 9th Army in the north had 335,000 men (223,000 combat troops), the 4th Panzer Army had 223,907 men (149,271) and Army detachment Kempf had 100,000 men (66,000) for a grand total of 778,907 men (518,271). The Red Army used two Fronts (Army groups) for the defence and one Front as a reserve. The Central and Vornonez Fronts fielded 12 armies. Central Front had 711,575 men (510,983 combat troops), Voronez Front had 625,591 men (446,236) and Steppe Front had 573,195 men (449,133) for a grand total of 1,910,361 (1,426,352). When the Red Army launched their counteroffensive in the north, the German 2nd Panzer Army was attacked by two Soviet Fronts: Brijansk and West. The 107,000 men of the 2nd Panzer Army and some reinforcements in the south brought the Wehrmacht troops to approximately to 950,000 men (approximately 650,000 combat troops). The two Soviet Fronts brought the Red Army to 2,629,458 men (1,987,463 combat troops).

Sub-operations and nomenclature

For Wehrmacht's OKH, the Battle of Kursk was a part of the strategic Operation Citadel Offensive (). For Soviet historians the series of operations conducted as part of the Summer–Autumn Campaign of 1943 (1 July – 31 December) include:pp. 82–113, Glantz (1990) Orel-Kursk Defensive Operation (5–11 July) Belgorod-Kursk Defensive Operation (5–23 July) Denial air operations over the Kursk Bulge (5–23 July) Air superiority operations in Operation Kutuzov Volkhov-Orel Offensive Operation (12 July – 18 August) Kromy-Orel Offensive Operation (15 July – 18 August) Air superiority operations in Operation Rumyantsev Belgorod–Bogodukhov Offensive Operation (3–23 August) Belgorod–Khar'kov Offensive Operation (3–23 August) : Battle of Prokhorovka (12 July 1943) Zmiyev Offensive Operation (12–23 August) The exact definition of the operations varies. The Germans saw it only as the Operation Citadel offensive, while the Soviet and Russian historians continue today to combine Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, as a single strategic event.

Preliminaries

Aviation

The Soviet Air Forces (VVS) played a significant role in hampering German preparations. On 17 April 1943, a raid on the German airfield at Orsha-South destroyed five Ju 88 reconnaissance aircraft from 1.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 100 and 4.(F)/121, and three Do 17s/ Do 217s of 2. Nachtaufklärungsstaffel. Three days later, another ten high-level reconnaissance aircraft were destroyed on the ground. As a result, the only operational strategic reconnaissance Staffel was 4.(F)/14.Bergström 2007, pp. 16–17. The Luftwaffe was also busy before the main operation. The tank factory at Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ) was subjected to a series of heavy attacks throughout June 1943. On the night of 4/5 June, He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 1 (KG 1), KG 3, KG 4, KG 55 and KG 100 dropped 179 tons of bombs, causing massive destruction to buildings and production lines. All of GAZ No. 1 plant's 50 buildings, of conveyers, 5,900 pieces of equipment and 8,000 tank engines were destroyed.Bergström 2007 p. 20. However, the Germans made an error in target selection. The GAZ plant No. 1 produced only the T-70 light tank. Factory No. 112, the second-biggest producer of the more formidable T-34, continued production undisturbed: 2,851 tanks were produced in 1943, 3,619 in 1944, and 3,255 in 1945. Soviet production facilities were repaired or rebuilt within six weeks. The Luftwaffe also failed to hit the Gorkiy Artillery Factory (No. 92) and the aircraft plant where the Lavochkin La-5 and La 5FN were made.

Ground

soldiers assemble in preparation for the attack]] It took four months before Hitler allowed Manstein to attack, by which time the Germans had added 90 Elefant Panzerjägers, all 79 flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft,Bergström 2007, pp. 124–25. as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-IVs and even a number of captured T-34s.Töppel 2002, p. 33–34. In total, they assembled some 3,000 tanks and assault guns, 2,110 aircraftBergström 2007, pp. 123–25.figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin. and 435,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy . By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military strength. Although actions in North Africa hardly constituted the Red Army's longed-for second front, the operation there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of Luftwaffe losses occurred in the battles over Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe and was gaining in technological quality as well. Both air forces possessed very effective ground-attack aircraft types capable of destroying armor: the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added Bordkanone 37 mm gunpods).Bergström 2007 p. 79–81; 102; 106; 114; 118. The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on 1 July, the orders were issued to attack on 5 July. The following day, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky warned the Front commanders ( N. F. Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. S. Konev) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between 3 and 6 July. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from the Red Orchestra spy ring (German: Rote Kapelle), and the " Lucy Group" espionage organization, whose sources allegedly included officers in Hermann Göring's aviation ministry and other parts of the Nazi administration.Mulligan 1987, pp. 236, 254. Preliminary fighting started on 4 July 1943 in the south, as 4th Panzer Army elected to try to take Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on 5 July, sacrificing tactical surprise. Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin, having received reports that the German offensive was imminent, ordered Voronezh Front to bombard German positions on the night of 4 July.Clarke 1966, p. 329. In the afternoon Stuka dive bombers blew a two mile wide gap in the Soviet front lines on the north in a period of 10 minutes and then turned for home while the German artillery opened up to continue the pounding. Kempf's armored spearhead, the III Panzer Corps, then advanced on the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time, the Großdeutschland Division attacked Butovo in torrential rain and the 11th Panzer Division took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher for Großdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division; they met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The II SS Panzer Corps launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts and again met with strong resistance, until assault troops equipped with flamethrowers cleared the bunkers and outposts. At 02:30, the Red Army hit back with an artillery bombardment in the north and south. This barrage by over 3,000 guns and mortars expended about half of the artillery ammunition for the entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they attacked, resulting in much weaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. This bombardment disrupted German units and caused them to attack at different times on 5 July. In the south, the Red Army chose to fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack but caused few casualties.

Main operations — the northern face

German onslaught

The 9th Army attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on 5 July. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the Red Army Central Front. Attacking on a 45 kilometre wide front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive minefields and needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few Goliath and Borgward remote-controlled engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields, they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Red Army units covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying German engineers clearing manually; German losses were high. For example, the German 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 49 "Ferdinand" (known in the West as " Elefant") heavy tank destroyers; 37 of them were lost in the minefields before 17:00 on 5 July. Although most of the lost vehicles were mobility kills rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could be repaired. They were also easier for Red Army artillery to knock out permanently. However, since the Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be recovered, repaired, and put back into action. After the first day of attack, the German units penetrated 8 km deep into the Russian lines for the loss of 1,287 killed and missing and 5,921 wounded.Frieser p. 108. The Germans noted a fundamental flaw in their armored vehicles, particularly the Elefant. Although excellent against any Soviet tank at long to medium range, they lacked secondary armament and were vulnerable to attacks from Soviet slit trenches, once they were separated from the heavy machine gun protection of the lighter tanks, vehicles and infantry. Guderian noted in his diary: On the second day, the Central Front under Rokossovskiy started a counter-attack against the German 9th Army, particularly the XLVI Tank Corps. The Red Army attacked with the 2nd Tank Army and the XIX Tank Corps, but this operational counter-attack was launched too early. Soviet tanks sustained heavy losses in their first combat with Tiger tanks of s.Pz.Abt 505. The 107th and 164th Tank Brigade lost 69 tanks and the Soviet attack was stopped.Glantz p. 93. After the encounter with German Tigers, Rokossovskiy decided to dig in most of his tanks and use them as static anti-tank guns.Rokossovskiy p. 266. The next two days of the attack saw heavy fighting around the strong point of Ponyri (on the Orel–Kursk railway), which was one of the most fortified positions in the northern sector. Both sides saw this area as a vital point; a very intense battle took place. The German tanks were awaited by 70 antitank guns per km.Piekalkiewice, Unternehmen Zitadelle, p. 154. On 7 July the 86th and 292nd German Infantry Divisions attacked Ponyri and captured the town after intense house to house fighting. The Soviets counter-attacked and forced the German troops to withdraw temporarily; many counter-attacks by both sides followed and the town changed hands many times. Not before the evening of 8 July did the German units capture most of the town. The heavy Ferdinands were called into action to take Hill 253.3 and succeeded on 9 July. It developed into a battle of attrition with heavy casualties for both sides; Keegan called Ponyri "the new Douaumont".Keegan p. 72. German units were exhausted, while Russian reserves were committed. Model decided to pause to rearrange his units.Frieser, p. 110. On 10 July, he renewed his attack with additional air support, but his gains were minor. Fresh Soviet formations repelled German attacks and only limited penetrations were achieved; the diary of the 9th Army describes the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle". Model canceled the new attack. The cancellation of the attack changed German plans; Model accepted that his forces did not have enough power to advance directly through the Soviet strongpoints. He decided to bypass the heights of Ol'chovatka and shift the schwerpunkt to XLVI Panzercorps. He also decided to use the uncommitted 12th Pz. Div. For the first time in the northern sector, a heavy concentration of tanks was planned. Model's hesitation to use the concept of concentration, which is described as the decisive element of an armored attack,Guderian, Achtung-Panzer! led to a slow advance of the 9th Army. Because of the limited action of the tank units, only 63 tanks and assault guns were written off by 12 July.Frieser p. 111. Soviet formations, including the 3rd Tank Army and the 11th Guards Army, attacked the German 2nd Panzer Army, positioned in the rear of 9th Army. The outnumbered 2nd Panzer Army had trouble with the Soviet attack. Soviet formations made a deep penetration and threatened German supply routes. With their advance on Orel the encirclement of the 9th Army was possible.Overy 1997, p. 205.

The end of Zitadelle in the north

The 9th Army had to withdraw and used an opportunity created for them by the Luftwaffe. Their part in the offensive was over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the south, the German armor losses were comparatively light — 143 vehicles were the total losses between 5 and 14 July.Restayn and Moller 2002, pp. 333–36. Central Front losses were 526 tanks. This failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and matériel arriving for the Red Army. Few Red Army guns were captured and those Red Army units that retreated did so on orders. The German attack had nearly broken through the main Soviet defence zones but stalled. The Soviet counter-offensive compelled Model to withdraw or risk the destruction of both German Armies.Overy 1997, pp. 204–5.

Northern analysis

A number of factors explain the 9th Army's lack of progress, mainly the combination of Soviet defensive planning and German lack of concentration of force. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength and often without sufficient infantry support.Restayn and Moller 2002, p. 333. Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had fortified those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The 13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units and held the strongest defensive positions in the salient. Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south and the German 9th Army committed major units piecemeal because Model was afraid of the Bryansk Front, which stood ready for counterattack to the north of his army. Model decided to place his most powerful corps group, Korpsgruppe Esbeck (2 Pz. Div and 1 Pz. Gren. Div), far behind the frontline to use it as "fire brigade" against a possible onslaught by the Bryansk Front. Model's decision not to use his Panzer divisions as a concentrated force can be seen as the most significant reason for the poor penetration of the northern pincer.Frieser, p. 107 Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced infantry divisions that were already in the line facing the Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted units. Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration clearly shows the success of the Red Army defensive tactics. While it began with a 45 km wide attack front on 5 July, the next day the German 9th Army's front was reduced to 40 km. This dropped to 15 km wide by 7 July and to only 2 km on 8–9 July. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: 5 km on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By 10 July the 9th Army had been stopped.Overy 1997, p. 204. Much of the Soviet defensive success is attributable to its method of fire control, known to the Germans as Pakfront. This relied upon a group of 10 or more anti-tank guns under a commander, which would fire at one target at a time. These positions were protected with heavy concentrations of mortar and machine gun nests, which were ordered to fire on German infantry only.Clark 1966, pp. 331–32.

Main operations — the southern face

German attack

Von Manstein's troops in the south were better equipped than Model's in the north. The 4th Tank Army and Armygroup Kempf had 1,377 tanks while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanks.Frieser, p. 112. The 1,377 tanks included 102 Panzer VIs and 200 Panzer Vs. The 4th Tank Army ( Hoth) attacked in two directions with the XLVIII Panzer Corps and the II SS Panzer Corps. The flanks of the spearheads were protected by the LII Corps on the left and by Armygroup Kempf on the right. The XLVIII Tank Corps was to be the lead spearhead so they were reinforced with 200 Panthers. Their opponent was the Voronezh Front. At 04:00 the attack began; nearly all units advanced with good speed despite encountering well prepared defensive positions and minefields. Manstein's tanks were much more successful than their northern counterparts. The main reason for this was his better use of tanks in concentrated spearheads. In the south the Red Army had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses evenly. Three of the four armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometre of front; this contrasts with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. The Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone thinly, leaving a higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. The Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, and it faced much stronger German forces. tank assigned to the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich rest after heavy fighting in the southern sector.]] The new Panther tanks failed to perform to expectations, as they proved to be unreliable. When the new tanks moved into their assembly areas, 45 out of 200 experienced mechanical problems requiring repair.Frieser, p. 113. When the remaining Panthers launched their attack they immediately ran onto a minefield and many tanks were immobilised. In the first two days the II SS Tank Corps penetrated 25 km deep into the Russian lines and took Jakovlevo. The 200 Panthers of XLVIII Tank Corps to the left spent more time in the workshops than fighting the enemy. Armygroup Kempf, which was to assist the II SS Tank Corps, was outnumbered and had problems crossing the Donec. The steady progress of the German units forced the Russian leaders to commit some of their strategic reserves, as nearly all operational reserves were in action. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months prior to the operation as a central reserve. As early as 6 July Stavka decided to send the II, X Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army to the southern sector; a day later other formations got their marching orders. Vatutin planned an operational counterstrike against the German units but decided to cancel it after the failure of the northern counter-attack. Instead of seeking open battle against the German tanks Vatutin let his tanks dig in as Rokossovskiy did in the north.Glantz/House, p. 102. Zhukov protested against this use of the tanks but Vatutin's decision stood. German officers reported that they were slowed down by the Schweigepanzer (silent tanks), because it cost much time to overcome these camouflaged "bases". Frieser, p. 116. Despite the order to dig in many of their tanks, enough tanks remained to launch some counterattacks. On 8 July a German tank commanded by SS Unterscharführer Franz Staudegger met a group of about 50 T-34s. In the following battle Staudegger knocked out 22 T-34s; he was awarded the first Knights Cross for a Tiger commander.Wendt p.18 The German tanks' advance was slowed. On the 9 July the first German units reached the Psel River. The next day the first infantry units crossed the Psel. By 10 July German units in the south had lost 166 tanks. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses were remarkably low.Geheime Kommandosache The 11th of July was a successful day for German units; Armygroup Kempf achieved a breakthrough and the III Panzercorps penetrated deep into Russian lines. The next night the 6th Pz.Div took a bridge over the Donec with a coup de main (a swift attack using the element of surprise).Frieser, p. 118. Kempf's III Panzercorps advanced to Prokhorovka from the south and the II SS Panzercorps from the west, almost trapping the Russian 69th Army. At this moment Manstein thought he had achieved the final breakthrough and could now operate freely and destroy the Russian reserves.Manstein p. 500 Meanwhile the Red Army planned a huge counterattack to destroy the spearheads of Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South).

Prokhorovka

Accounts of this battle are controversial. The original Soviet account of a brave but reckless if ultimately successful mass Red Army assault on heavy German armor is now generally discounted; the most recent revisionist accounts suggest a Soviet debacle, with the Soviet charge on German armor being disrupted not by German tanks but because many T-34s fell into a Soviet anti-tank ditch.Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War, London, Allen Lane, 2008, p. 488. What is generally not disputed is that the Red Army did enough, at great cost, to stop a German breakthrough. In that sense this remains a crucial turning point of the battle and indeed of the Great Patriotic War: here the German army was stopped. On the morning of 12 July Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, collected reserves of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka. At the same time the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began. The German units had 494 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces in the attack, with 90% operational.Frankson, p. 30. The men of the 5th Guards Tank Army had not yet been committed to battle, so they were fresh. The German force found itself heavily outnumbered. After the battle was over, the Soviets held the area and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews.Clark 1966, p. 337.Healy 1992, pp. 76–7. The battle can best be described as a costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. The air battle was also intense; von Manstein had intended it to be the decisive blow against the Red Army forces to prevent a breakthrough to Oboyan and Kursk. The 5th Guards Tank Army had moved mainly at night, bringing 593 tanks and 37 self-propelled artillery pieces into position at Staryy Oskol.Bergström 2007, p. 77. Sturmoviks from 291 ShAD attacked the II SS Panzer Division throughout the day, causing significant damage to German armored formations. Simultaneously, waves of Hs 129s and Ju 87s caused losses to the 69th Army and 5th Guards Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, a report from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery". Losses were so heavy that the advance had to be halted and a switch to the defensive was ordered.Bergström 2007, pp. 79–80. The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the VVS being concentrated over the flanks of the 4th Panzers. The Soviet 31 Guard Tank Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the II SS Totenkopf to a standstill by getting in close to the German armor and attacking the vulnerable sides of the Tigers. The II SS was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost 50 percent of its armor in a prolonged engagement. By the night of 11–12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses was a captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The LSSAH had been stopped by the Soviet 18 Tank Corps; III Panzerkorps and Das Reich were checked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and two more Soviet reserve corps.Healy 1992, p. 84–7. Tank losses in the battle have been a contentious subject. Red Army losses have been given from 200 to 822 tanks but the loss records show about 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. German losses have been reported to be as low as 80 and as high as several hundred. This number is impossible to establish because of the German way of counting lost tanks. 60 to 70 German tanks are thought to have been total losses.Bergström 2007, p. 81. In any event, the losses for both the II SS Panzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the "Greatest Tank Battle" of all time fell short of the mythic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokorovka engagement. According to Soviet data the Germans lost 400 tanks in this battle and 3,500 soldiers were killed.

The end of Zitadelle in the south

While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had breached the first two defensive belts and believed that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts, and some of them did not have troops deployed. Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves. On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face Operation Rumyantsev, an offensive launched to smash the German forces in the Belgorod–Kharkov area on 3 August. Belgorod fell on 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171.

Southern analysis

The German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attack frontage width and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. A 30 km wide attack frontage on 5 July became 20 km wide by 7 July and 15 km by 9 July. Likewise, the depth of penetration dropped from 9 km on 5 July to 5 km on 8 July and 2–3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled. Red Army minefields and artillery were successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans allowed their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order. German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which began the operation with 118 tanks. On 10 July, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on 5 July.

Hitler cancels the operation

On the night of 9–10 July, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned Günther von Kluge and Erich von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory: "on no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had committed were decisively beaten". In an unusual reversal of their roles, Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July, he ordered a withdrawal and canceled the operation. He then ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be transferred to Italy.Clarke 1966, pp. 337–38. Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs,Manstein, Verlorene Siege p. 504. and by some historians.Engelmann, Zitadelle p. 5. For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.Carell, Only one German division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy, without their equipment. The remainder stayed to face the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.

Reasons for the failure of Zitadelle

Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser points out these reasons for the failure of Operation Zitadelle:
  • The Soviets had numerical superiority. Frieser points out that the biggest problem of the OKW was the shortage of infantry. The OKH had no operational reserve while the Red Army could field an entire front ( Steppe Front) as reserve. That the Red Army had more tanks than the Wehrmacht had less influence on the outcome according to Frieser.Frieser, p. 149.Krivosheev, p. 188–190.Zetterling/Frankson p. 116, 117.
  • Repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to fortify the bulge around Kursk to an enormous fortress. High officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared and low on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The overlap with the Allied invasion of Sicily made Hitler's date for the attack the "most adverse possible".Magenheimer, die Militärstrategie Deutschlands 1940-1945 p.244
Military historian and Soviet military expert David Glantz draws these conclusions:
  • Glantz asserts the German defeat at Kursk did not come about by the "often-exaggerated numerical superiority" of the Soviet armed forces. The principal factor at Kursk was the revolution in Soviet command, staff, operational and tactical techniques. The General Staff had learned lessons from previous battles and disseminated "war experience" based on "exhaustive" analysis of battles, operations and campaigns. These lessons were added to Soviet doctrine ( Soviet deep battle), producing new procedures.Glantz & House 1995, p. 176. Glantz and House have asserted the tank strength was even, between 1:1 and 1.5:1 in the Soviets' favour.Glantz & House 1995, pp. 149-150.
  • Glantz contends the Soviets introduced new operational and tactical techniques. They worked out many of the difficulties of integrating arms and services into "a true combined arms operation". Glantz emphasises "sophisticated understanding of intelligence, deception, and anti-tank defence". Similar improvements were made in the combined use of artillery, tanks, engineers, and infantry to break German defences on a narrow front. At Prokhorovka and in the Kutuzov operations, the Red Army gained experience with mobile armored formations and mechanized corps that became the hallmark of Soviet deep operations. These formations demonstrated their ability to match the best efforts of the German Panzer force. Operations still needed to be perfected to reduce huge casualties. Nevertheless, the German command recognised that at Kursk they faced an entirely new and more competent Red Army.Glantz 1991, pp. 132-133.
  • Glantz points out defensive tactics had improved. Skillful use of anti-tank artillery in strong points and the use of separate tank brigades, tank regiments and self-propelled gun units to support them offered mobile defence support. These units participated in wearing down tactical attacks against enemy spearheads. The transitional year of 1943 was decisive for the Soviet war effort. Operational and tactical techniques tested and smoothed out in 1943 would be refined further and perfected in 1944 and 1945. "The elementary education the Red Army received in 1941-42 gave way to the secondary education of 1943. In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets would accomplish university-level and graduate study in the conduct of war".Glantz 1991, pp. 136-137.
Military expert Steven Zaloga offers these insights about the Red Army at Kursk:
  • Zaloga contends the popular perception of Soviet victory "by numbers" as a myth created by German generals in their memoirs written in the 1950s. Zaloga rejects the caricature of the Red Army relying on mass rather than tactical skill. Zaloga accepts that at the tactical end (the platoon and company level), the Red Army was not particularly impressive and received significantly poorer training.Zagola 1989, p. 6. Zaloga points out that there were still many tactical lessons to be learned; however by 1943 the gap between Soviet and German tanker training had "narrowed greatly", and the Soviets were soon at a comparable level with the Germans.Zagola 1989, p. 18.
  • Zaloga asserts that the Soviets, in terms of operational art, were adept at using mobile tank formations. Zaloga asserts that Soviet operational methods were superior, allowing Soviet field commanders to bluff, baffle and overwhelm their opponents.Zagola 1989, p. 7.
Historian Richard Overy makes the following interpretations:
  • He points out that the quality of the two air forces were even. The Soviets had introduced air-to-ground communications, radar, a proper maintenance system, and depots for forward fuel reserves. This allowed aircraft to fly twenty missions in the heat of the battle (while the Luftwaffe suffered shortages).Bergström 2007, p. 48–9.Overy 1997, p. 192.
  • The Soviets were not inferior in the quality of their tanks. Although the T-34 model (with its 76 mm main gun) was out-ranged by German Tiger and Panther tanks, it was faster and more manoeuvrable than the former and the latter had too many mechanical difficultiesOvery 1997, p. 207. at the Battle of Prokhorovka. To counter the Tiger tank, the Soviets used their tanks in a "hand-to-hand" combat role. Crews were ordered to close the range so that it would not become an issue.Overy 1997, pp. 207-209. According to Glantz and House the Soviet tanks pressed home their initial attacks despite significant German advantages: the range of the German tanks' 88mm gun, German air superiority, and attacking a well dug-in enemy while covering flat rolling terrain. Even so, the loss ratio was less than 2:1, 320 German and 400 Soviet AFVs.Glantz & House 1995, P. 167.

Russian counterattacks

In the north: Operation Kutuzov

Operation Kutuzov was launched on 12 July against the southern wing of Army Group Centre. The counterattack was launched before the Germans had stopped their attack, so Operation Kutuzov had a bigger effect on the outcome of Zitadelle when compared to the southern counterattack, which was launched after the cancellation of Zitadelle. The Briansk Front (commanded by Popov) and parts of the Western Front (commanded by Sokolovskij) attacked the largely undefended German north flank of the 2nd Panzer Army on 12 July. The 2nd Panzer Army was diminished as many tanks were transferred to other armies before Zitadelle. On 12 July the attacking forces numbered 487,111 combat troops supported by 1,401 tanks and 15,109 guns.Koltunov, p. 80. Three days later the second phase of Operation Kutuzov started with the attack of the German 9th Army by several Russian armies. The combined troops deployed for Kutuzov now numbered 1,286,049 men supported by 2,409 tanks and 26,379 guns.Koltunov, p. 82. The operations of the Briansk Front marked the beginning of the Russian summer offensive. The artillery barrage was heavy and the first German lines were overrun. German defensive lines were deeper than expected and many Russian spearheads were slowed and sustained heavy casualties,Rendulic, Die Schlacht von Orel, p. 134. but in some areas the Russian units achieved deep penetrations.Frieser, p. 185. The Germans lacked reserves to block these penetrations, so the situation became very dangerous for the 2nd Panzer Army. On 13 July Army Group Centre gave command of the 2nd Panzer Army to Model, who already commanded the German 9th Army. Model now was in control of all German units in the Orel area. The situation for the Germans worsened as Russian breakthroughs threatened the entire 9th Army. Model sent nearly all of his Panzer units to aid the 2nd Panzer Army whose northern front was about to collapse, while the 4th Army in the north sent the 253rd Infantry Division. German units achieved a temporary stabilization of the front but meanwhile the 9th Army started to withdraw from the captured ground. Initially, the Russian Central Front followed hesitantly, but then started attacking in earnest with heavy air support. On 18 July the 9th Army was at the same position as on 5 July, before the start of Zitadelle. Russian tank formations failed to achieve an operational breakthrough despite their numerical superiority.Rotmistrov, The Role of Armoured Forces p. 173. Red Army tank armies repeated their attacks against the same positions with the same methods and suffered heavy casualties in men and tanks. For example, the 4th Tank Army lost 84% of their T-34s and 46% of their light tanks within a few days.Sutov/Ramanicev, p. 277. After two weeks of fighting the 3rd Guards Tank Army had lost half of their 800 tanks. The German armies conducted a fighting withdrawal to Hagen-Stellung.Frieser, p. 188. Organized by the Red Army, approximately 100,000 partisans supported the Russian operations.Frieser, p. 187, according to Soviet numbers. German movements were hampered by partisans disrupting German supply routes, especially railway lines. On 3 August partisans launched a large operation against the German rear, the so called "Railway-war". By shortening their line the Wehrmacht freed 19 divisions, which could be used elsewhere or held as reserves. Nevertheless, the Soviets achieved a complete breakthrough. The Soviets massed a concentration of artillery and tanks on small narrow fronts and used sophisticated artillery techniques to defeat German fortified positions despite tenacious German defences. Operation Kutuzov "was a perfect example of the newly sophisticated Soviet way of war".Glantz & House 1995, p. 168. On 5 August the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered Orel and by 18 August, the Briansk Front had reached the city Briansk, "completely eliminating the German salient in the region". The battle was the bloodiest of the three major operations during the Battle of Kursk. The German losses were 86,064 men; the Red Army lost 112,529 men and 317,361 were wounded.Glantz & House 1995, p. 297. The losses for the Red Army were particularly high for tanks and assault guns: 2,586 of them were written off during Kutuzov.Krivosheev, p. 278. German tank losses are not available for this battle, but Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) lost 343 during Zitadelle and Kutuzov. Some of the Soviet commanders were displeased, complaining that an even greater victory might have been won. Marshall Rokossovskij said, "Instead of encircling the enemy, we only pushed them out of the bulge... The operation would have been different if we had used our force for two heavy punches which met at Brijansk". Zhukov held a similar opinion.Zhukov p. 188. Stalin instead thought encirclement tactics could wait: "It is our task to push them from our territory. We can trap them when they are weaker".

In the south: Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

To the south the Red Army needed time to regroup after the losses sustained in July, and could not launch another offensive until 3 August, when Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced. Stavka planned Operation Rumyantsev as the major thrust of their summer offensive. The aim was to destroy Manstein's 4th Army and Army Group Kempf and later the southern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South). The German 1st Tank Army and newly formed 6th Army were to be trapped by an advance to the Black Sea.Glantz/House p. 241 The Russian Southern Front and the Southwest Front attacked as early as 17 July. The Voronez Front and the Steppe Front deployed about 1,144,000 menKrivosheev. p. 190. supported by 2,418 tanksKoltunov p. 81. and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers for the attack. At the start of "Rumyantsev" the Germans fielded only 237 tanks and assault guns. Manstein believed that the Soviets were incapable of launching an offensive in the southern sector, and dispatched his reserves (II SS Panzerkorps, XXIV Korps and XXXXVIII Panzerkorps) southward to deal with Soviet offensives across the Dnieper and Mius Rivers. The Soviet operations in those regions were actually carefully planned diversion operations. The Soviet plan worked; German reserves were removed from the critical Kharkov axis (conforming to Maskirovka: military deception). The tactical operations across the Mius were unsuccessful, but achieved their primary aim of diverting German forces further away from Kharkov, although by Soviet accounts, the Stavka had wished for more.Glantz & House 1995, p. 352. For the Kharkov offensive the Red Army focused enormous firepower on a 30 km front. The 5th and 6th Guards Armies, two elements that had borne the brunt of the German offensive, and the Soviet 53rd Army took part. The artillery concentration was necessary to puncture the first five German defence lines between Kursk and Kharkov. The 1st Tank Army and 5th Guards Army, supported by two additional mobile corps, would act as a mobile operational unit to encircle Kharkov from the north and west. To the west, four separate tank corps would support the 27th and 40th Armies would make supporting attacks. To the east and south-east, the 69th and 7th Guards Armies, followed by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, would also support the attack.Glantz & House 1995, pp. 168–169. On 3 August the initial attack demonstrated the growing sophistication of Soviet tactical art. Heavy and long-range artillery bombarded German positions, supported by anti-tank shock groups, ready to repel counter attacks. The German defence was tenacious, and two tank armies had to enter the battle to secure a penetration. By 5 August the Soviets had broken deep into the German rear and captured Belgorod, advancing some 60 km into German lines. Each combined-arms army pressed the German defences from the north and east.Glantz & House 1995, p. 169. German reserves were rushed from the Orel sector and north from the Donbas regions (where Soviet maskirovka operations had diverted them) and tried to break up Soviet attacks. The only success was achieved by the Grossdeutschland Division, which succeeded in delaying the 40th Army on 6–7 August. Four infantry divisions and seven Panzer and motorised divisions were assembled under the III Panzerkorps. Manstein tried to repeat the success of Third Battle of Kharkov, where the Soviets had been over-extended and defeated. This time the Soviets were alert to the danger, and it was the German forces that were worn down.Glantz & House 1995, pp. 169–170. On 12 August, units of the newly arrived 2nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision "Das Reich" and SS Panzergrenadierdivision "Totenkopf" started a counterattack against two Soviet Armies near Bogodukhov, 30 km northwest of Kharkov. The Waffen-SS units trapped and anhilatend many Soviet units during the following maneuver battles. To assist the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army joined the battles. All three Soviet armies suffered heavily and the tank armies lost more than 800 of their initial 1,112 tanks.Frieser, p. 196.Glantz&House 2005, p. 249. After the counterattack of the two German divisions, the Soviet tank armies were not longer capable of offensive actions.Glantz & House, Battle of Kursk, p. 249. The Soviet advance around Bogodukhov was stopped so the German units now tried to close the gap between Achtryrka and Krasnokutsk. The counterattack started on 18 August and on 20 August "Totenkopf" and "Großdeutschland" met behind the Soviet units. Parts of two Soviet armies and two tank corps were trapped, but the trapped units heavily outnumbered the German units. Many Soviet units were able to break out while suffering heavy casualties.Glantz & House 2005, p. 251. After this setback the Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23 August. The battle is usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation by the Soviets.Glantz & House 1995, p. 70. Soviet casualties in the Belgorod–Kharkov sector during this operation were 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded; 1,864 tanks were lost and 423 artillery guns were lost. German losses were 10,000 killed and 20,000 wounded. German tank losses are estimated at least 8 times lower than Soviet tank losses of 1,864.Frieser p. 199.

Results

The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armor than in previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and were surprised by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This was an outcome that few had predicted, and it changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front. The victory had not been cheap; the Red Army, although preventing the Germans from achieving their goals, lost considerably more men and materiél than the Wehrmacht. Heinz Guderian wrote in his diary: From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the Red Army, while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting rather than attacking. A new front had opened in Italy, diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East. The loss convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his General Staff. His interference in military matters progressively increased, so that by the end of the war he was involved in tactical decisions. The German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted personally to micromanage the day-to-day operations of what soon became a three-front war. The opposite was true for Stalin. After seeing Stavka's planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions. The Red Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluid as the war continued.

Casualties

German

According to German historian , who interpreted German archives, the Wehrmacht suffered 54,182 casualties in total during Operation Citadel (4–16 July). Of these 9,036 personnel were killed in action, another 1,960 were reported missing in action, and 43,159 wounded in action. The German Ninth Army (under the command of Army Group Centre) suffered 23,345 casualties while and Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties.Frieser 2007, p. 154. For Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev Frieser states between the 1–20 August,Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units suffered 25,068 casualties, including 8,933 killed and missing. For Rumyantzev he estimated ~30,000 men lost with 10,000 killed and missing. For Operation Kutuzov Frieser gives 86,064 casualties with 14,215 killed, 11,300 missing and 60,549 wounded.Frieser 2007, p. 202. Total casualties for the "Battle of Kursk" were ~170,000 men. According to Frieser , the Wehrmacht lost 252 tanks and assault guns during Operation Zitadelle (until 20 July). Army Group South admitted losses of 161 tanks and 14 assault guns by 16 July. The German Ninth Army reported the loss of 41 tanks and 17 assault guns up to and including the 14 July. Among these were ten Tiger tanks, 42 Panther and 19 "Ferdinand" or "Elefant" heavy tank destroyers. Other losses included 109 Panzer IVs, 38 Panzer IIIs, 3 flame tanks and 31 assault guns.Frieser 2007, p. 151. The number of lost tanks for Zitadelle and the Soviet counter offensives is hard to establish. Frieser gives the number of 1,331 tanks destroyed for the entire Eastern Front for July and August. Frieser estimates the number of tanks destroyed during the Battle of Kursk as 760. Frieser explains that many of these tanks were beyond repair and abandoned. David Glantz gives a total of 49,822 casualties.Glantz 1999, p. 338. Glantz asserts German losses during the Soviet counter offensives are unavailable.Glantz 1999, p. 345. Glantz estimates that 1,612 tanks and assault guns were knocked out and/or damaged, of which 323 were destroyed.Glantz 1999, pp. 276. Tank losses from counterattacks are uncertain according to Glantz. Aircraft losses, according to Frieser, totaled 524. For Zitadelle (5–20 July) 159 were lost, while 218 were destroyed during the Soviet Operation Kutuzov and a further 147 during Polkovodets Rumyantsev.Frieser 2007, p. 204. According to Christer Bergström, the Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe reported 97 aircraft lost between 5–8 July ( Fliegerkorps VIII 58 and Luftflotte 6 39). For the period 5–31 July, Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe gives figures of 681 lost from the two air fleets (335 for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftflotte 6). Of this total 420 were written off; 192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and 229 from Luftflotte 6.Bergström 2008, p. 120. According to Soviet numbers the Red Army smashed thirty German divisions, inflicting the following casualties between 5 July and 23 August 1943: 500,000 dead, wounded, and captured soldiers; 1,500 tanks and 3,700 planes destroyed.

Soviet

David Glantz quotes Grigoriy Krivosheyev as the most reliable source. According to Glantz' interpretation of Krivosheev's work, which interpreted Soviet archives, Soviet losses at Kursk during Citadel (known to the Soviets as the Kursk strategic defensive operation, 5–20 July) amounted to 177,874 casualties.Glantz 1999, p. 274. The Central Front suffered 15,336 killed and 18,561 sick or wounded for a total of 33,897 casualties. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 killed and 46,350 sick or wounded for a total of 73,892 casualties. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 killed with 42,606 sick or wounded for a total of 70,085 casualties.Glantz 1999, p. 275. Glantz estimates Soviet losses during Operation Kutuzov at 112,529 killed and 317,361 wounded for a total of 429,890 casualties; the Western Front as losing 25,585 killed and 76,856 wounded and sick; the Bryansk Front suffered 39,173 killed and 123,234 wounded and sick. The Central Front lost 47,771 killed and 117,271 wounded and sick.Glantz 1999, p. 276. Total casualties for the "Battle of Kursk" were 863,303 men. The Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (3–23 August), according to Glantz and official Soviet sources, were 255,556 casualties, including 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded. The Voronzeh Front lost 48,339 killed and 108,954 wounded for a total of 157,293 casualties. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 killed and 75,001 wounded for a total of 98,273 casualties. Soviet material losses for Citadel (5–20 July) amounted to 2,586 tanks and Self-propelled artillery out of 3,925 committed to combat (well over 50 percent). Roughly, this was seven times the number of German losses. The number of losses in the Polkovodets Rumyantsev operation were also heavy. Glantz quotes Krivosheyev's numbers of 1,864 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns out of 2,439 engaged, well over 50 percent. The loss ratio was roughly 5:1 in favor of the Germans.Glantz 1999, pp. 276–277. Frieser also supports Krivosheyev's casualty figures for men and armor.Frieser pp. 150, 200 onward According to Christer Bergström, Red Air Force losses amounted to 677 on the northern flank and 439 on the southern flank of the bulge during Citadel. In the north, 5–11 July, Soviet losses amounted to 430 destroyed aircraft. The 2nd Air Army suffered 433 casualties in total in the north during July 1943. Total losses for the 17th Air Army were 244 during the same period. Other unit casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet air losses were 1,104 between 12 July and 18 August, covering Operations Citadel and Kutuzov.Bergström 2008, p. 121.

Notes

;Footnotes ;Citations

References

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Further reading

"green air" © 2007 - Ingo Malchow, Webdesign Neustrelitz
This article based upon the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk, the free encyclopaedia Wikipedia and is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.
Further informations available on the list of authors and history: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Kursk&action=history
presented by: Ingo Malchow, Mirower Bogen 22, 17235 Neustrelitz, Germany